Veikko Huuska

Gazpromin johto: paljon palkkaa ja taustat Leningradissa

Gazpromin johdolla muhkeat palkkiot: miltei puolet hallituksesta ”Leningradin poikia”

Miten Venäjällä menee? 

Hyvin, ainakin jos arvioimme asiaa Gazpromin hallituksen jäsenten ansiotulojen perusteella.

Gazpromin hallituksen jäsenet tienasivat vuonna 2015 keskimäärin 159 miljoonaa ruplaa.  Se vastaa OP:n valuuttalaskurin mukaan 2.121.680 euroa.

https://www.op.fi/op/henkiloasiakkaat/tilit-ja-maksut/valuuttalaskuri?id=13102

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Liksat nousivat

Edelliseen vuoteen verrattuna Gazpromin hallituksen jäsenten tienestit kasvoivat 6,3 %.  Hallituksen saamien korvausten yhteissumma oli 2,703 miljardia ruplaa eli noin 36,2 miljoonaa euroa.  Tiedot ilmenevät Russian Accounting Standard (RAS):n julkaisemasta kaasualan holdingyhtiötä koskevasta tuoreesta raportista.

Gazprom on Venäjän suurin yhtiö ja maailman suurin maakaasun tuottaja.  https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gazprom   engl.; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gazprom

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355 kertaa keskiansio

Suomen Pankin/BOFIT –sivuston Venäjätilastojen mukaan Venäjän kansalaisten keskipalkka vuonna 2015 oli 498 euroa/kk (5.976 euroa/vuosi).  Kaasujätti Gazpromin hallituksen jäsenten keskipalkkataso vastasi siten tavallisen työläisen 355 vuoden palkkaa.

http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit/seuranta/venajatilastot/Pages/default.aspx

Teoreettisesti voimme verrata Gazpromin hallitusnerojen palkkiotasoa Suomen oloihin tähän tapaan;

Suomalaisen keskipalkka on viime tilastojen mukaan 3.135 euroa/kk, mediaani (vuodessa 37.620 euroa).  Tämä kerrottuna kertoimella 355 tuottaisi hallitusammattilaiselle huippuansiot: 13.355.000 euroa.  Aivan näin korkeisiin syleily-palkkioihin ei taida Suomessa yltää yksikään hallitusnero.  Toisaalta eihän meillä ole Gazpromiin rinnastettavaa luonnonanti-yhtiötäkään.

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Gazprom vähensi vuonna 2015 kaasuntuotantoaan 6 %:lla.  Vuosituotantoa karttu 417 miljardia kuutiometriä, ja tuloja 2.542 miljardia.

Hallituksen jäsenten tulot sisältävät palkan, bonukset sekä palkkiot osallistumisesta OAO Gazprom –yhtiön johtoelintyöskentelyyn. 

Yhtiötä koskevan aineiston mukaan hallituksen jäsenten yhteenlasketut palkkiot vuonna 2015 olivat 1,429 miljardia dollaria ja palkkiot 1,155 miljardia.

Siten kunkin hallintoneuvoston jäsenen keskitulot olivat lähes 159 miljoonaa ruplaa, mikä dollareina on noin 2 miljoonaa $.

Tällä hetkellä yrityksen hallitus käsittää 17 henkilöä:

Alexey Miller, hallituksen puheenjohtaja, Forbesin Maailman mahtajat-listalla sijalla 54; nousua huipulle ei ainakaan hiekoittanut se, että Miller työskenteli Presidentti Vladimir Putinin Pietarin pormestarinkansliassa vuonna 1990, ja sittemmin toimi yhdessä Dmitri Medvedevin kanssa tämän pääministerikauden alkuvaiheessa, Venäjän varaenergiaministeri 2000.  Puheenjohtaja Miller kuuluu Yhdysvaltain sanktioiden piiriin, kuten myös hänen johtamansa yhtiö Gazprom; http://www.forbes.com/profile/alexey-miller/    & Miller on syntynyt 1962 Leningradissa ja valmistunut siellä Vosnezenskyn Leningradin talousyliopistosta. – Kuten jatkossa havaitsemme ns. ”Leningradin pojat” ovat varsin hyvin edustettuina tässä suuryhtiö Gazpromin hallitusjäsenten listalla.  Heitä, Putinin Leningradikkoja, on tässä kaikkiaan 7 yhteensä 18:sta.  http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/miller/

Elena Vasileyeva, syntynyt 1959 Kurganissa, valmistunut Leningradissa, jossa myöskin työskennellyt: Pietarin tyttöjä, voisi jokin chauvinisti tokaista; mukana Itämeren kaasuputkihankkeessa 1999-2001 ja vuodesta 2001 lähtien  Deputy Chairwoman of the Management Committee, Chief Accountant of Gazprom. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/vasilieva/

Valeri Golubev, syntynyt 1952 Leningradissa (VVP:n ikätoveri), valmistunut Leninille nimetystä Uljanovin teknologia-instituutista, palvellut mm. KGB:ssä 1979-1991, toiminut mitä moninaisimmissa tehtävissä Leningradissa, muun muassa turistibyroon johtotehtävissä, saanut Etelä-Ossetian myöntämän ystävyyden kunniamerkin; http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/golubev/

Nikolay Dubik, Varsinainen Gazprom mies, lakiosaston johdossa: palvellut yhtiössä jo Jeltsinin aikaan, vuodesta 1997 lähtien. Gazpromin ohella Nikolai Dubik on työskennllyt Shtokmanin kaasuyhtiöhankkeessa.  Dubik syntyi 1971 Moskovan alueella ja opiskeli myös Moskovassa. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/dubik/  - Bloombergin tuoreen päivityksen (16.2.2016) mukaan tohtori Dubik ei enää toimi Gazpromin hallinnossa, koska hän kuoli 23.6.2015;  "As of June 23, 2015 Mr. Dubik passed away." http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=25265237&privcapId=7680427 Katso Nikolai Dubikin veljen Sergey Dubikin kuvioista alla; linkki http://rusmafiozi-eng.blogspot.fi/2012_11_01_archive.html

Alexander Kozlov, syntyi 1952 Tulassa, opiskeli Moskovassa, palvellut Venäjän ulkoministeriön alaisuudessa sekä presidentti Putinin presidentin esikunnassa ym. 2000-2005, jolloin siirtyi Gazpromiin. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/kozlov/

Andrei Kruglov, syntyi 1969 Leningradissa, valistunut Leningradista, palvellut mm. pankkisektorilla. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/kruglov/

Vitaly Markelov, syntynyt 1963 Mordoviassa, valmistunut Kuibyshevin ilmailuinstituutista, työskennellyt öljy- ja kaasutehtävissä Siperiassa. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/markelov/

Alexander Medvedev, syntynyt 1955 Sahalinilla, valmistunut Moskovasta, työkokemusta Itavallasta.  http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/medvedev/

Sergei Khomyakov,  Sortavalan poikii”, syntynyt nimittäin Sortavalassa 1955, valmistunut Leningradista, Gazpromissa vuodesta 2003.   http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/khomyakov/

Oleg Aksyutin, syntynyt 1967 Kuibyshevissa, valmistunut Kuibyshevin ilmailuopistosta, haasuhommissa vuodesta 1998. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/aksyutin/

Sergei Prozorov, syntynyt Bryanskissa 1958, valmistunut sikäläisestä koneenrakennusinstituutista, Gazprom-mies vuodesta 1980, eli nyt jo yli 35 vuotta http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/prozorov/

Dmitry Lugano, johtaja Lugano on ilmeisesti viimeaikaisia nimityksiä, koska konsernihallinnon sivuilla hän ei esiinny, mutta verkosta löytyy päiväämätön uutinen, jonka mukaan Lugano näyttäisi toimivan yhtiön tulevaisuudensuunnittelun osastolla: Head of Department for perspective development Dmitry Lugano added that claims to supply independent suppliers is not backed by real-world gas reserves."We conducted expert evaluation of proposals Rosneft, you all hear how actively the company says about its potential. Wanted to draw your attention to those proposals, which makes Rosneft, built not on the inventory and resources. Those potential gas reserves that have yet to be opened. Resources are evaluated in larger quantities than stocks, and very easy to make statements about potential mining opportunities," said Lugano.He noted that Gazprom owns more than half of the gas reserves in Eastern Siberia, and they focused in five fields. At that time, as from independent suppliers. http://www.shopsmix.ru/786.html (sivu on ilmeisesti päivitetty 3.2.2015, vh) - http://www.gazprom.com/about/subsidiaries/list-items/vniigaz/ LYugai on syntynyt Samarkandissa 1962, valmistunut TAshkentista ja omaa pitkän työrupeaman kaasualan tehtävissä.

Vladimir Markov, syntynyt 1955 Tambovissa, valmistunut Ryatzan radio-insinööri opistosta, toiminut aikanaan NKP:n Ryatzan piiri- ja aluekomiteassa, Venäjän Federaation Duuman jäsen 2007-2011, josta lähtien Gazpromissa. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/markov/

Elena Mikhailova, jostain syystä vaikuttaa siltä että Elena on johtoryhmän ns. kiintiönainen, syntynyt 1977 Pskovissa, valmistunut lakimieheksi Moskovassa, Gazpromiin 2012. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/mikhailova/

Kirill Seleznev, syntynyt 1974 Leningradissa, valmistunut Pietarissa ja työskennellyt siellä eri tehtävissä, Gazpromiin 2001.   http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/seleznev/

Igor Fedorov, syntynyt Leningradissa 1965, valmistunut Leningradin valtionyliopistosta lakimieheksi ym,, tiedustelu- ja sotilastehtävissä 2002.-2003, jolloin Gazpromiin.   http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/fedorov/

Vsevolod Cherepanov, syntynyt 1966 Frunzessa, valmistunut Moskovasta, työskennellyt geologian alan tehtävissä, kunnes 2008 Gazpromiin. http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/cherepanov/

FreeNewsin Gazprom-hallituslistalta puuttuu;

Vyacheslav Mikhalenko, syntynyt 1965 Bryanskissa, jossa myös valmistunut, palvellut mm. Tulan kaasuputkiyhtiössä, Gazpromiin 2007. Mihalenkon valinnasta Gazpromin johtoon tiedotettiin 28.9.2015; http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2015/september/article247710/  & http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/board/mikhalenko/

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LNG:n myynti

"Gazprom"-Ryhmän myynnin kasvu nesteytetyn maakaasun (LNG) suhteen oli 5,5 %, ja näin saavutettiin 4749 miljardin kuutiometrin myyntimäärä. Vuonna 2014 myynti LNG oli 4,5 miljardia kuutiometriä.

Gazpromin LNG-lähde on "Sahalin-2" –projekti, ja se onkin tällä erää ainoa aktiivinen LNG -projekti Venäjällä. Lisäksi ryhmällä on omistuksia siellä ja se harjoittaa LNG-ostoja eri tahoilla.

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http://freenews.xyz/2016/02/15/the-members-of-the-board-of-gazprom-in-2015-earned-on-average-by-159-million-rubles/

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Muuan tapauskuvaus 2012

Gazpromin lakimiesjohtaja Nikolai Dubkinin veljen,  Sergey Dubkinin elämästä;

http://rusmafiozi-eng.blogspot.fi/2012_11_01_archive.html

Interior Ministry mafia wages war on Presidential administration

http://rumafia.com/news.php?id=482

Sergey Ivanov, former deputy Prime Minister, was appointed head of Presidential Administration. The official is not prone to dramatic reshuffles in staff; however, Rumafia sources in the Kremlin claim that Ivanov will introduce a number of changes in staffing in the nearest future. The position of Presidential Civil Service chief is about to become vacant. Currently it is filled with Sergey Dubik, a business partner and a close friend of the most corrupt police General Andrey Khorev, former first deputy head of the Interior Ministry Department of Economic Security. Dubik, who was in the centre of a number of scandals, may soon face dismissal.

General career Lord

Sergey Dubik can hardly be called a public figure. The last time he was mentioned in the press was in June 2011 in connection with a car accident. Dubik’s vehicle ran into a security SUV, part of his own motorcade. The security Range Rover stopped to let people cross the road at a crosswalk. Dubik’s driver was too late to react and the BMW with the official ran into the SUV.

 Nevertheless, Dubik’s name is quite frequently mentioned behind the scenes in most power ministries and the judiciary. As Presidential Civil Service chief, he is in charge of promoting, conferring ranks and awards, and distributing of apartments and other bonuses and amenities. Thus, if Dubik asks a General for a favour, the General willingly does whatever he was asked to do.

 It is no surprise that many major “problem solvers”, namely former and acting law enforcement agencies officials, refer to their friendship with Dubik when they promise to solve the problems of this or that businessman. Such friendship guarantees that problems will be solved at the highest level. For example, Anatoly Shavlyakov, former high-ranking Interior Ministry Investigative Committee official, claimed that he forwarded most of the money he received as tools to Dubik asking at least 3 million dollars for initiating and terminating a criminal case. By the way, Shavlyakov was notorious for driving a Bentley vehicle to work while he was an acting police officer.

Among the closest friends of Dubik there is Andrei Khorev, the owner of hotels and villas all over the globe. Khorev has recently been in the centre of corruption scandals. While in office, he turned the Department of Economic Security into a business ready to provide any service for a fee.

The latest success of Dubik was resounding victory over the trade union of Presidential Administration and government employees. This came about after the trade union leaders revealed large scale scams that concerned apartment allocation. The scams were drawn up by Dubik’s closest associates. Most front-line employees of the government agencies forming the trade union were off the collective labour agreement, which earlier could protect their rights at least to some extent. The trade union leader, Lyudmila Popkova, who pushed for the scam revelation, may soon be incarcerated over evidence collected by Khorev’s subordinates.

 Kremlin allocation conveyor

At some point of time a well-known journalist Vladimir Soloviev held an independent investigation. He found that Presidential Civil Service gave straight orders to judges of various jurisdictions concerning rulings in favour of relevant businesses. Valery Boyev, Dubin's secretary, filed a lawsuit against the journalist. However, during the litigations at Dorogomilovsky court the claims of intervention were  confirmed by Elena Valyavina (deputy chairman of the Supreme Arbitration court), Evgeny Ilyin (chairman of Moscow region Arbitration court), Boris Kanevsky (chairman of Nizhny Novgorod regional court), and Artur Absalyamov (chairman of the tenth Arbitration court of Appeal), after which Boyev urgently dropped the lawsuit. Regardless of the scandal that erupted, Dubik kept his position. Moreover, he remained member Higher Qualification Panel of Judges.

His powers and strength of his position are partly due to nepotism. Sergey’s brother Nikolay is head of law department at Gazprom and friend of Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov who studied at Moscow State University at the same time as Nikolay Dubik. Gazprom top-manager Vladimir Alisov, also a friend of Nikolay Dubik, is a close relative of Tver court of Moscow chairman, Igor Alisov. And there are plenty other connections like that.

Dubik allocated apartments belonging to President’s Executive Office fund to his close Kremlin associates as if the apartments were his own, some worth a million dollars. This was revealed in 2009 by Leutenant-General Sergey Khlebnikov, Governor of the Kremlin.

Khlebnikov paid special attention to the spacious costly apartment allocated to his aide, Federal Protective Service official Sergey Shestakov. The general shared his concerns with Lyudmila Popkova, head of the trade union of Presidential Administration, government staff, the Council of Fereration, Accounting Chamber, and Presidential Executive Office. Khlebnikov addressed her for a reason. Popkova was on the board of apartment allocation committee of the Presidential Administration. She found the fact of allocation quite peculiar and conducted an insider probe.

Popkova soon found that Shestakov and Baryshnikova, another Kremlin official close to Dubik, registered in the apartments they live four of their long gone relatives. After that they appealed for housing improvement, groundlessly and regardless of the existing queue of other claimants. Thus, Shestakov and Baryshnikova got new expensive apartments. Among those in the official claim by Baryshnikova there was her mother, a citizen of Ukraine born in 1914 who had perished seven years ago. Somehow she also participated in the privatization of the apartment.

An even more shocking situation concerned the assets allocated to Anatoly Ivanov, deputy chief of a department within the government agency headed by Dubik. Ivanov received not an apartment, but a subsidy for its purchase totaling to 22 million rubles, to which there were no relevant grounds. This happened with direct involvement of Dubik.

Oleg, Akimov, Dubik’s deputy of legal affairs, was involved in a notorious scandal concerning a takeover of 2,200 hectares of arable lands in Yegorievo district of Moscow region. Sergey Dubik was directly involved in the scam and was considered one of the masterminds behind it.

Trade union chairman tried to draw attention of the Kremlin officials to the revealed scams. But Dubik skillfully curbed all her activities in that regard. The collected data was given over to the Ministry of the Interior, namely to Andrey Khorev. Popkova, who was not familiar with the official's ties inside Kremlin, did not know that the General was a friend of Dubik’s. As a result, the collected materials never reached the investigators. Instead, they mysteriously disappeared and Dubik learnt about Popkova’s actions. He got angry and nursed a grudge against her.

 Trade union revolt

Soon Dubik had another reason to be angry at the trade union leader. In 2010 Popkova drew up a collective labour agreement on labour and vacation conditions for employees of all agencies in the trade union.  Sergey Naryshkin, head of Presidential Administration, instructed Dubik to clear through all relevant documentation. But the Civil Service official was not satisfied with any of the suggestions by the trade union. For instance, he did not like a provision specifying fixed working hour, adequate nutrition, bonuses, abiding work place laws, etc. Popkova was resentful to introduce any changes in the agreement for which she literally got consent from Naryshkin. Dubik was outraged and declared war. Passes of trade union activists were canceled, they were not allowed in their own receptions, and were deprived of offices and their phones were switched off.

 In January 2010 the trade union held a conference for reports and elections. Those present at the conference appointed Popkova as head of the trade union for another five year term.  However, in May Dubik asked her to “leave while she can”. Popkova turned him down.  “If so, I will have you put behind bars,” Dubik told her. “You do know, don’t you, how influential I am with the FSB and the Interior Ministry". Later these threats were repeated by Anatoly Ivanov, whom we mentioned earlier. He said that “Dubik has already called Khorev about you. So you’d better resign while you can”.

Regardless of a presidential decree, Popkova was off the allocation committee. She addressed Naryshkin for assistance. He promised to help her. After his promise Human Resources Management of the Presidential Administration sent an official address to Ministry of the Interior Department of Economic Security asking to conduct a probe into Popkova’s activities. Khoprev personally supervised the probe carried out by his subordinate, Oleg Letuchev. Popkova was hospitalized in late May 2010 as a result of a mental breakdown. On 1 June Dubik held an extraordinary session of the trade union. Oleg Letuchev, officer at Department of Economic Security No 8 operational office, was the principal speaker.

He read a report on the probe into the activities of Popkova and added that “she has stolen 25 million, we are about to put her in prison”. As a result it was decided to dismiss Popkova from the trade union. The position was filled with Evgeny Tatarenko, a 64 year old Presidential Administration employee and a friend of Dubik and Ivanov.

Popkova tried to appeal against the dismissal in courts of various jurisdictions. However, taking into account Dubik’s influence on the judiciary, success of such an appeal was out of the question. Illegal intervention by the administration and the Interior Ministry in the activities of the trade union were criticized in a number of mass media publications by Mikhail Shamtkov, chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia. He called Dubik’s actions a "raider takeover". Lyudmila Popkova addressed President Dmitry Medvedev in a letter which was publicized by a number of news agencies. This outraged Dubik even further.

 Who gets sentenced first?

 Khorev received consent for Popkova’s prosecution.  In August 2010 Ministry of the Interior Investigative Committee initiated a criminal case against Popkova based on the evidence forwarded from Presidential Administration Human Resources Management at the Department of Economic Security.  Aleksandr Matveyev, Investigative Committee investigative unit head, directly participated in the events.  So did Mukhamed Musov, head of a department within the agency; and investigator Evgeny Denisov, who had twice turned down the appeal to institute criminal proceedings over apartment allocation fraud under Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, thus deliberately concealing the crime and committing abuse of power.

Several dozens of investigators and other operational personnel collecting compromising materials on Popkova came up with a frame up. The accusations against the former trade union leader were as simple as that: in spring 2010 she organized several concerts for 6,000 trade union members the cost of which amounted to 940 thousand rubles. Department of Economic Security employees recalculated the expenses stating the actual cost of the events at 4,700 rubles. It is not clear how they managed to include all payments to the performers, the banquet, presents for the veterans and so on in the 4,700 rubles. According to the investigators, Popkova misused the remainder allocated funds, which is subject to prosecution under Article 160of Russian Criminal Code.

The mentioned data is being prepared to serve as evidence in court. It is certain that in any other case law enforcers’ activities would have been challenged. But the litigation will take place in Tver court of Moscow, the one chaired by Igor Alisov, a friend of Sergey Dubik. And also the one to which Popkova and the redundant trade union members appealed against the unlawful dismissal. The judge, Lyudmila Bykovskaya, denied satisfaction of the lawsuit and was promoted to being a judge at Moscow city court. Dubik, as member of Higher Qualification Panel of Judges, decides whether a judge would be paid 100 thousand rubles pension or would be fired, so to say, with no severance package. Lyudmila Popkova and the dismissed employees in the trade union appealed against the unlawful decision of the judge Bykova before the European Court stating 12 violations of Labour legislation.

A lot has changed in law enforcement agencies since the beginning of the war against Popkova. Some officials, namely Khorev, Matveyev, and Musov failed state certification and were dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior. However, Dubik is still in office, and that means that the case against the former Presidential Administration trade union head will not be terminated. Nevertheless, Sergey Ivanov joining Presidential Administration may lead to a drastic change in the situation.

Major General Khorev memorandum, sent to deputy head of RF Investigative Committe. The document contains list of files with the materials of the probe into Ms Popkova

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Yksi käyttäjä suosittelee tätä kirjoitusta. - Näytä suosittelija

NäytäPiilota kommentit (4 kommenttia)

Käyttäjän rakennusliikeerbau kuva
Pekka Iiskonmaki

Voisiko olla jo niin, että pesää lypsetään tyhjäksi?

Käyttäjän pekkaroponen1 kuva
Pekka Roponen

Aleksei Miller (Алексей Борисович Миллер)

Jelena Vasiljeva

Jelena Mihailova

Vsevolod Tserepanov

Vjatšeslav Mihalenko

terv. Dr. Besserwisser

Käyttäjän veikkohuuska kuva
Veikko Huuska

Kiitos. Kiinnitin asiaan huomiota, mutta en "ehtinyt" oikeinkielistää; kun riittävän kauan lukee anglistisia muotoja, niihin jotenkin turtuu..

Käyttäjän veikkohuuska kuva
Veikko Huuska

Asiasta kiinnostuneille:
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Tässä tuore tutkimus;
Can Russia Succeed in Energy
Pivoting to Asia?
DR.
ELENA
SHADRINA
(Meiji
University)
tutkimus on päivätty tammikuussa 2016.
Venäjä alkoi painoittaa euraasialaista politiikkaansa itään jo ennen sanktioita, mutta on niiden aikana 2014 kesästä lähtien vain kiihdyttänyt kokonaissuuntautumistaan Euroopasta (Länsi-Euroopasta) yhä vain määrätietoisemmin Aasiaan. Energiasektori on tässä ymmärrettävästi ollut ”keihäänkärkenä”;
http://www.eppen.org/en/resim/haber_resim/EPPEN16....
1. Introduction
Diversification of energy export has become one of the most remarkable trends in
Russia’s energy policy. What makes this diversification especially noteworthy is the fact that it implies not a mere geographical re-orientation of the energy flows - away from the European and towards the Asian markets - but involves considerable structural changes across a broad set of Russian energy policy issues.
Russia started considering the possibility for oil and natural gas supplies to Asia since the
early 1990s (Eder et al. 2009; Henderson 2011). More discernibly, the idea of Russia’s energy export diversification as one of the goals of the national energy policy surfaced in the early 2000s (Shadrina 2010). This target was emphasised more clearly in the Energy Strategy 2030 endorsed in 2009. That year, the second Russia-Ukraine transit crisis happened, energy demand in Europe declined over a severe economic slump and the EU adopted the Third Energy Package (TEP), which de jure banned Gazprom’s business model in Europe (Yafimava 2013).

The new Russia’s Energy Strategy until 20351 is being prepared in the environment of
tightening economic sanctions2 imposed by the EU, US and other nations against Russia over the latter’s stance in the Ukrainian conflict, deepening economic recession in Russia
(additionally worsened by the sharp fall in oil and other natural resources prices) and
progressing regulatory reforms in Russia’s principal oil and natural gas importer – the EU -
towards harmonised energy market institutionalised in the form of the Energy Union.3
Widening institutional divergence with the EU over energy governance have already resulted in a noticeable decline in the bilateral energy relations (Shadrina 2014a, Henderson and Mitrova 2015). Once the EU regulatory reforms are fully implemented, Russian energy suppliers will face drastically different business environment in which they are predetermined to play a smaller role. Seen in this light, Russia’s expedited pivoting to Asia appears to be entirely rational.

As Russia turns to Asia, it is worth examining its Asian energy policy in-the-making and
assess its validity. The report illuminates recent transformations in energy policy of Russia
vis-à-vis Northeast Asia (NEA).4

Russia’s prospects for larger energy cooperation with Japan depend on the latter’s
demand for fossil fuels, which is closely linked to the issue of nuclear energy resumption; the potential for indigenous production through renewable energy development, as well as the progression in the production of methane hydrate; and the possibilities for other supplies in the Japanese market, first of all, of North American LNG. The disparities between Russia and Japan over the long-standing territorial issue and more recently Japan’s stance on the Western sanctions against Russia are additional factors, which, to an extent, affect the bilateral relations in energy sector.

The scope for Russia’s energy cooperation with Korea depends largely on the trends in
the country’s energy demand, which, in turn, is derivative of the government policy priorities in the segments of renewable and nuclear energy, as well as a result of competition among the external suppliers of energy resources. Although geopolitical factors continue to restrain the possibilities for Korea’s pipeline links with Russia, the report argues that the bilateral energy ties can see more vigour.

The largest uncertainties that Russia faces are vis-à-vis China. China’s weakening energy
demand (a result of decelerating economic growth), certain advances in its ambitious strategy for indigenous energy production (CBM, shale gas and oil, etc.), progress in the domestic gas market liberalisation and so forth, define the country’s motivation for energy cooperation with Russia. By the virtue of their geographical location, Russia and China have much greater options for developing versatile energy cooperation; the benefit that they have already started to employ by developing trade in electricity, coal, launching the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, beginning the construction of the Power of Siberia (PoS) gas pipeline and so on. Even so, an appropriate question to ask here is: Does this larger scale and diversity of cooperation indeed signify a strategic partnership?

The report aims to demonstrate that it does, yet arguing that strategic thinking is at times in shortage on Russia’s side.

It has been noted in the opening lines that Russia’s energy diversification is a
multidimensional task. Indeed, as Russia’s ability to supply NEAs with energy resources
depends upon the progress in developing the resource base of Eastern Siberia and the Far East (ESFE5), domestic regional economic development is an indispensable element of Russia’s Asian energy policy. Furthermore, development of energy resources requires trade, investment, technology and other forms of cooperation.

Therefore, seeking to answer the principal question – Can Russia be a better partner to NEAs? – the report also explores whether the existing intergovernmental and issue- and sector-specific bi- and multilateral institutions are instrumental in enhancing Russia’s energy cooperation with NEAs.
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Lisäksi:
Gazprom Investor Day, helmikuussa vuosi sitten (2015), HongKong & Singapore;
50 pientä sivua tiukkaa asiaa; yhtiön esittelymateriaalia, tuotannosta ja suunnitelmista
http://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/38/513195/gazprom-in...
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